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Abstract
This article relies on a visual ethnography with young people between 13 and 20 years old. Young people were asked to
make visual collages of fictional social media accounts, which are used in this article to analyse the signification of “good”
and “bad” reputation in digital youth culture. It explores how reputation is performed visually and aesthetically in digital
youth culture. The aim is to contribute to the critical study of digital reputation, it formulates an ethical critique on how the
signification of digital reputation has formed alongside values and beliefs that support the growth of platform capitalism,
rather than assigning a reputational value and rank responsibly. I conclude how the signification of digital reputation is
not only conformist and essentialist but also meaningless. The banality of reputation argues that, in the context of pop‐
ular social media, there is no real or substantial information made available to distinguish between a “good” or a “bad”
reputation, except for stylized banality, a stylistic focus on lifestyle and commodities. The point is that reputation should
not be banal and meaningless. Many important political and institutional decisions in a democracy rely on the evaluation
of reputation and critical assessment of the information upon which such evaluations are made. Although platform capi‐
talism has made digital reputation meaningless, it is in fact an essential skill to critically orient oneself in digital societies.
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1. Introduction
Reputation is a high‐stakes issue in the public sphere
and popular culture. The so‐called “cancel culture,” the
“withdrawal of any kind of support (viewership, social
media follows, purchases of products endorsed by the
person, etc.) for those who are assessed to have said
or done something unacceptable or highly problematic”
(Ng, 2020, p. 623), has been the downfall for a significant
number of celebrities in the past few years. High‐level
cases of reputation loss have illustrated that, despite out‐
standing reputation management for decades, a sudden
and shocking fall from grace could happen to any star.
Yet concerns regarding the potential that one may
experience a downfall caused by a rapid and unpre‐
dictable drop in reputation status resonate beyond the
world of stars. Reputation capital, one’s accumulated sta‐
tus and rank, is an asset that especially in the context
of digital media is a concern for young people and their
parents too, with Pew Research Center surveys show‐
ing that teens are active reputation managers. A major‐
ity of parents are also “very concerned” about digital
reputation (Madden et al., 2013). Safeguarding children
and young people’s future reputation capital when liv‐
ing a digital life is not easy. “Bad” decisions, for exam‐
ple, a nude picture circulating without consent, might
forever circulate—“trending” algorithms are unforgiv‐
ing technologies.
Digital reputation and how it is experienced (through
shame, guilt, popularity, and influence) causes harm in
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digital life. While reputation might encourage people to
improve themselves, “good” digital reputation is, as I will
argue, also conformist and essentialist. Indeed, digital
reputation is a kind of violence; it may produce or rein‐
force pre‐existing social inequalities and hamper peo‐
ple’s ability to live alongside those in society who are
different. While reputation is symbolic, constructed, and
performed in nature, it has enormous psychological and
social‐material value; “to exist means to be assigned a
value in a ranking, in a system that makes comparisons
possible. To be is to be comparable” (Origgi, 2019, p. 158,
original emphasis). In this article, I will explore value and
rank in the context of social media and young people’s
digital cultures by asking: What does digital reputation
signify in digital youth cultures?
Digital reputation has mainly been the domain of
management studies, exploring how brands, organiza‐
tions, and individuals can monitor reputation as well as
howonline techniques andmethods canbeused tomake
something more attractive (Schultz et al., 2000). Further,
media literacy pundits have argued that online reputa‐
tion management should be an essential skill, empha‐
sizing the importance of privacy settings and the risks
of oversharing things online. More critical explorations
of digital reputation remain understudied, however.
Recently, Gandini (2016) argued that the commercial
measurements of someone’s individual digital reputa‐
tion has become a determinant factor for career success
(e.g., measurements of “social influence” based on num‐
bers of followers on social media). Further, Rosamond
(2019) has argued that the 2016 presidential Trump cam‐
paign, whichmobilized trolls to capitalize on the volatility
and loss of reputation, introduced “reputation warfare”
as a dominant digital reputation paradigm. Rosamond
argues that reputation volatility is the new norm, instead
of secured reputation measurement and capital.
My aim is to contribute to the critical study of digital
reputation by focusing on how conformist and essential‐
ist interpretations of digital reputation have been formed
alongside values and beliefs supporting the growth of
platform capitalism (Srnicek, 2016). My objective is to
ethically critique the moral economy of digital reputa‐
tion in the context of social media and digital youth cul‐
tures (Hesmondhalgh, 2017; Sayer, 2007), and to assess
how significations of “good” and “bad” reputations refer‐
ence “proper activities” that support the platforms’ busi‐
ness. To do so, I will use a visual ethnography (Pink, 2013)
to analyse how digital reputation is symbolically made
sense of by young people between 15 and 20 years old,
focusing on aesthetics and visual self‐representations of
“good” or “bad” digital reputations.
I consider the critical study of reputation in digital
youth cultures important because while “digital reputa‐
tionmanagement” is taken for granted as a digital media
literacy strategy, it may reinforce social exclusion. It ben‐
efits platform capitalismmore than it benefits young peo‐
ple and society. I will conclude by making an argument
that digital reputation has become banal; “good” repu‐
tation signifies meaningless self‐representations, tropes
and clichés, commodities and instagrammable lifestyles.
“Bad” reputations signify the spectacle of reputation
volatility, the loss of digital reputation and the practice
of shaming as entertainment. The banality of reputation
is, however, not a good thing for democracy or soci‐
ety (Origgi, 2019). While reputation is constructed and
performed, the assessment of rank and value cannot
be left to radical relativism or instagrammable tropes.
Assessing reputation in a contextualized, fair, ethical, crit‐
ical, and compassionate way is an important, certainly
not banal, skill.
2. The Formation of Digital Reputation
Reputation is often seen as a “mark of modernity” but
Origgi (2019) argues this is a mistake. Rather, reputation
is central to human psychology: “Anxiety about how we
see ourselves seen exists in all cultures and manifests
itself at a very early stage of child development” (Origgi,
2019, p. 24). Despite it not beingmodern, reputation has,
since the early 2000s, become a central feature of peo‐
ple’s digital lives and taken on particular significance in
Western societies and culture—it is this particular signif‐
icance that I will explore in this first part.
From a socio‐cultural perspective, the formation of
digital reputation might be seen as a language contain‐
ing no essence but formed in “shifting relations of dif‐
ference” and as such establishing itself “with other con‐
cepts and ideas in a signifying field” (Hall, 1997); while
the essence of the distinctions between “good” and
“bad” reputations might be mysterious, their meanings
are fixed in particular socio‐cultural formations at a par‐
ticular time. For example, in digital youth cultures, repu‐
tation establishes itself with culturally specific normative
believes about gender when girls are shamed dispropor‐
tionally more than boys for “harming” their online repu‐
tation by taking too sexy selfies (Korkmazer et al., 2020).
The socio‐cultural work of digital reputation organizes
people into different social groups and acts as a means
of “social human classification” (Hall, 1997).
I want to argue, however, that the significance of
digital reputation in digital lives has been formed along‐
side specific technocultural transformations such as the
transition to a user‐generated web in the early 2000s.
Built around online participation, self‐representation,
and the data‐driven business models of platforms such
as Facebook, this technocultural formation meant the
end of the pre‐commercial internet (Lovink, 2012).
Popularity on the internet became seen as the foun‐
dation for a career, a gateway to digital entrepreneur‐
ship for the aspiring young (McGuigan, 2014). Methods
and techniques to systematically manage digital rep‐
utations became something that could be employed
not only by corporate brands (Schultz et al., 2000)
but also by ordinary people. The shifting boundaries
between public and private life brought a new kind of
“information war” (Thompson, 2011), giving power and
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“creditworthiness’’ (Rosamond, 2019) to thosewith good
reputations. Around 2006, high‐level stories of cyber‐
bullying and revenge porn started to circulate and made
way for Reputation.com, the first online reputation man‐
agement agency providing services to those who need
help with public shaming on the internet (Ronson, 2015).
The power of digital reputation, but also how mean‐
ings of digital reputation shift and are re‐appropriated,
have made digital life vulnerable and exhausting.
A moment of clouded judgement may lead to a loss of
reputation. A poorly formulated tweet, a drunken pic‐
ture, or sexting gone wild reduces someone to a single
“bad” decision (Phillips & Milner, 2017). The searchabil‐
ity and durability of online content, but also how gos‐
siping, shaming, and rumours are characteristic of dig‐
ital sociality are ongoing threats to digital reputations.
In the technocultural formations of contemporary dig‐
ital life, reputation is seen as capital turning “reputa‐
tion” into a financialized asset. Reputation capital, as
defined by Rosamond (2019), is a form of what Bourdieu
(1994) refers to as “symbolic capital”: “The aggregated
value of signs indicating the perceived esteem, honour,
respect, likeability, importance and/or trustworthiness
attributed to a given person or entity, understood as the
person or entity’s intangible asset” (Rosamond, 2019,
p. 4). Digital tools for monitoring financialized reputation
are assumed to “rationally” and “objectively” measure
reputation capital across social media platforms. Yet,
while reputation capital is assumed to be steadily built
over time, it is the volatility and the potential loss of rep‐
utation that characterizes reputation’s financialization.
For ordinary youths, the financialization and volatility
of digital reputation produce expectations and require‐
ments to maintain “good” reputations so as to not jeop‐
ardize their social value and (future) reputation capital.
In everyday life, despite being symbolic in nature, digi‐
tal reputation is interpreted as the essence of the digi‐
tal self that, once damaged, is difficult to fix. An exam‐
ple in digital youth cultures is the stigmatization of
“thosewho send sexts”: Young people are harshly judged
and excluded from their peer groups when sexting
because they have failed to maintain “good” reputa‐
tions (De Ridder, 2019), they have failed to protect their
future reputation capital. Digital reputation is an individ‐
ual responsibility that needs to be defended relentlessly,
for a loss of digital reputationmay beweaponized against
you (Rosamond, 2019) as some may find pleasure in see‐
ing your digital reputation destroyed. Reputation is an
important part of the affective experience of daily digital
life (e.g., anxiety, exhaustion, shame, and humiliation) as
its undoing means a rupture of one’s digital self (Origgi,
2019, p. 21).
3. Platform Capitalism, Social Media, and the Moral
Economy of Reputation
So far, I have argued that the financialization of digital
reputation refers to reputation as a calculable asset of
people’s social value and to the idea that a “good” digital
reputation is necessary to build a career in today’s knowl‐
edge economy: When maintaining “good” digital repu‐
tations there is the expectation of an economic return
(Gandini, 2016, p. 27). Moreover, I have argued that con‐
cerns about digital reputation are central to the affec‐
tive experience of digital life. In this part, I will further
explore how digital reputation is a “product” of the com‐
mercial internet and platform capitalism, and how the
significance of digital reputation is formed alongside the
norms, values, and beliefs that support the growth of
platform capitalism.
I refer to the moral economy of digital reputation to
explore the values and beliefs of what constitutes the
social human classifications of a “good” reputation in
the context of social media (Sayer, 2007). Platform cap‐
italism, like any other economy, is “suffused with val‐
ues and beliefs about what constitutes proper activity,
regarding rights and responsibilities of individuals and
institutions and qualities of goods, service and environ‐
ment” (Hesmondhalgh, 2017, p. 206). A moral economic
approach to digital reputation asks critical questions
about platform capitalism’s validity to make distinctions
between “good” and “bad” reputations. A moral econ‐
omy approach to digital reputation is an ethical critique
of platform capitalism, yet it also invests in politics and
power; the distinctions between “good” and “bad” rep‐
utation might (re)produce particular kinds of violence
that need to be addressed, it may reinforce already exist‐
ing inequalities and eventually hamper people’s ability to
live alongside those who are different.
The platform, as argued by Srnicek (2016), is a firm
built around the handling of data for profit. The platform
business affects every sector of the economy, but my
focus here is primarily on social media and the technol‐
ogy that they use for facilitating online participation and
self‐representation. The economic operations of social
media platforms are more than a shift in the business
models of the internet, they are “an ideal that can legit‐
imate contemporary capitalism more broadly” (Srnicek,
2016, p. 12). Platform capitalism is a hegemonic model
that can be applied to different businesses and sectors
(e.g., Srnicek provides the example of how cities are
expected to become “smart”) and social media applied
that model to facilitating and organizing sociality, com‐
munication, and connection by extracting data from its
users. I argue that there are two key values and beliefs
to how platform capitalism’s hegemonic model assesses
reputation in the context of social media. The first is an
expectation that one’s digital self and identity needs to
bemanaged, the second is that one is able tomaster pop‐
ularity and as such gain influence.
First, the efficient management of digital reputa‐
tion relies on authentic self‐promotion, which means
promoting the self in a “natural” way, staying true to
so‐called “innate qualities” of the self (Grazian, 2018).
Ideally, a digital identity with a “good” reputation avoids
anonymity, is transparent, coherent, and stable across
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platforms. This is something that platform capitalism
has a “vested interest in pushing as the need for a uni‐
form online identity attained maximum transparency,
not only because they want to know who their users
are, but also because advertisers want users ‘truth‐
ful’ data” (van Dijck, 2013, p. 200). Such a belief of
what constitutes a “proper” online identity was initially
pushed by Facebook (Kirkpatrick, 2010) but broadly
pushed a “hegemony of a single identity” in digital cul‐
ture (van Zoonen, 2013). Today, popular mobile applica‐
tions such as Snapchat and Instagram allow more play‐
ful engagements with the self and identity—Instagram
supports multiple accounts for users to engage with dif‐
ferent groups of followers (Leaver et al., 2020)—yet the
demand for coherent identity management is unlikely to
change, precisely because it is at the core of platform cap‐
italism’s hegemonic model of sociality.
Second, digital reputation is a matter of mastering
popularity and influence, primarily supported by tech‐
nology that allows social media users to manipulate
algorithms in order to make particular people, issues
or topics trend by “liking” and “sharing.” Social media
algorithms are in fact reputational technologies: They
continuouslymeasure social value and reputation capital
ambiguously. Algorithms are opaque, which contributes
to the volatility of digital reputations. Algorithms’ lack of
transparency also makes them exciting (Gillespie, 2018).
Reputational technologies play an important role in how
reputation’s volatility is capitalized upon: “Tactical inter‐
ventions” (e.g., large numbers of people “liking” or “shar‐
ing” at the same time) may quickly make or break a
reputation, making digital reputation a powerful (polit‐
ical) weapon in culture and society (Rosamond, 2019).
The logic of popularity is a battleground for the digital
reputation to be made and unmade. The attractiveness
of the unfolding spectacle of a broken reputation sup‐
ports platform capitalism, as it generates more traffic
and time spent on social media.
4. A Visual Ethnography of Reputation in Digital
Youth Cultures
This article relies on a visual ethnography to explore
the signification of digital reputation. Digital reputa‐
tion is primarily negotiated visually in contemporary
youth culture: Popular social media platforms and apps
such as Snapchat, TikTok, and Instagram have produced
an intense influencer culture that focuses on visuality.
Instagram in particular has heralded “a new class of con‐
tent creators who strive for authenticity on a platform
best known for selfies and self‐representation” (Leaver
et al., 2020, p. 26). In contemporary digital youth cul‐
tures, reputation is often aesthetically negotiated by
means of beautiful images: Such images have gained
significant social and economic influence in contem‐
porary culture (Manovich, 2020). Because digital repu‐
tation’s signification is primarily negotiated visually, a
visual ethnography is well suited to providing insight into
digital reputation in youth culture. As Pink (2013, p. 16)
notes, the visual is often interwoven with “our personal
identities, narratives, lifestyles, cultures, and societies.”
Visual ethnography is ameans to produce situated knowl‐
edge through images about (digital) everyday life.
To research the signification of digital reputation
in digital youth culture, visual research materials that
young people produced during ethnographic research
were collected. The analysis of these visual research
materials allowed me to explore how digital reputation
is constructed and performed. These analyzed visual
research materials are not realist representations of dig‐
ital reputation but symbolical explorations of reputa‐
tional signifiers such as “esteem, honour, respect, like‐
ability, importance and/or trustworthiness” (Rosamond,
2019, p. 4). During the ethnographic research activities,
participants were divided into groups and asked to visu‐
ally design fictional social media accounts with a good
or bad reputation by drawing and/or using magazines
to produce visual representations of imagined social
media profiles. During these research activities, conver‐
sations with the research participants about the repre‐
sentations that they produced were recorded and tran‐
scribed, these conversations also formed part of the
research data. I chose “analogue” visual research materi‐
als instead of digitally available visual material (e.g., pic‐
tures circulating on Instagram) to consider the “digital
intangible” (Pink et al., 2015, p. 72). Such a non‐digital‐
centric approach is a powerful method to explore how
the digital has become part of the every day and the
social worlds that people inhabit. Such an approach does
not focus on the digital, but on the complex relationship
between people’s digital and social worlds.
I analyzed the visual research materials by catego‐
rizing them as presenting a “good” or “bad” reputation,
allowing me to explore the significance of this distinc‐
tion. I explored (1) how reputation was constructed and
performed visually and aesthetically through symbolic
motives. Then, drawing on a moral economy approach
I explored (2) how distinctions between “good” and
“bad” were validated by hegemonic ideas that relate to
platform capitalism. I took a reflexive approach to ana‐
lyzing these materials, which means it was a collabora‐
tive effort between my own interpretations of the visual
research material and the interpretations of the young
people involved in the study.
My approach to the visual data is not rooted in a
semiotic approach to those images as “texts,” I did not
read those images in isolation. Rather, a visual ethno‐
graphic approach (Pink, 2013) recognizes how these
visual images are interwoven and connected to peo‐
ple’s identities, as well as how they are part of the
wider environments in which people live, such as peo‐
ple’s social life‐worlds and the technologies that are part
of everyday life. As I have previously argued, the sig‐
nification of digital reputation may produce classifica‐
tory systems through language; however, it is only when
these classificatory systems become a factor in everyday
Media and Communication, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 218–227 221
life through their interwovenness with practices, affec‐
tive experiences, and technologies that digital reputa‐
tion may become powerful by regulating people’s con‐
duct and experiences which may therefore potentially
produce or reinforce inequalities.
4.1. Introducing the Participants
The visual ethnography presented in this article is part
of a four‐year research project (2017–2021). The project
explores how digital reputation relates to everyday
power struggles of young people based on gendered, sex‐
ual, ethnic, and religious identity intersections. The goal
of this project is to find alternative strategies to improve
young people’s online well‐being which go beyond a
highly individualized focus on “online reputation man‐
agement” and take into account the dynamics of exclu‐
sion and subordination, related tomultiple identity expe‐
riences. This study supports this need as this research
has been conducted with a diverse group of young peo‐
ple who were actively engaged in the research process
(Sue et al., 2009).
The research presented in this article is empiri‐
cally driven, yet it is anti‐positivist. Such an approach
demands that the presented discussions are “radically
contextualized” (Ang, 1995), which means considering
spatial and temporal settings, as well as bearing in mind
the particular social categories and formations of the
participants. The participants, all of whom live in an
urban region of Dutch‐speaking Belgium were recruited
from two different secondary schools and one youth
organisation. The first school offers a general educa‐
tion (preparing students for higher education), having a
mostly white, middle‐class student population. The sec‐
ond school offers a vocational education, having an eth‐
nically diverse, and mostly lower‐middle‐class student
population. Finally, the youth organisation focuses on
empowering urban youth who are experiencing difficul‐
ties, helping them to navigate life, offering guidancewith
finding a job and/or leisure activities, with mostly lower‐
middle‐class youths being involved in this organisation.
In total, 29 (23 female and 6 male) youths between 15
and 20 years old participated in the production of the
visual research materials presented.
5. Symbolizing “Good” Digital Reputation
The visual research materials are, as shown in Figure 1,
creative collages that made use of sketches to get
across what they wanted to communicate about digi‐
tal reputation. Other than sketches, participants used
a broad selection of magazines that were provided by
the researchers, allowing participants to look for fit‐
ting visual material. In total, 10 collages that signify
“good” digital reputations were included in the analy‐
sis, referring to typically banal tropes and clichés. First,
participants used the “tropes and clichés” of what is
Instagrammable (Leaver et al., 2020). Instagrammability
signifies an “ideal” genre of visual self‐representation
that has become the norm across platforms and not just
on Instagram. Second, visually communicating virtues
such as having a positive attitude, volunteering, and
supporting left‐liberal activism were found to signify
a “good” digital reputation. Representing such virtues
through circulating beautiful images and attractive
lifestyles supports digital reputation’s banality. Often,
there is no interest in structural solidarity (Moran, 2014,
p. 153), yet there is the expectation of an economic
returnwhen symbolizing solidarity and optimism on pop‐
ular social media.
5.1. The Instagrammability of Reputation Capital
The visual aesthetics of a good reputation are built
around showing off one’s importance and likeability.
The collages show a visual economy of repetition around
the themes of being athletic and fit, eating healthy insta‐
grammable foods, being popular among friends, travel‐
ling, showing luxury consumables such as watches and
sunglasses, having a relationship (#couplegoals), and
being artsy and bohemian. A use of aesthetically pleas‐
ing compositions, poses, filters, or having a consistent
style in your profile (such as all black and white pictures)
are markers of one’s digital reputation. All of the col‐
lages showed how the metrification of one’s popularity
is important, having a significant following base indicates
influence—more than 1,000 followers seemed to be the
norm, but some collages made references to 1,3 million
followers. Also, accounts that do not follow as many pro‐
files as they have followers themselves are granted repu‐
tation capital.
The visual collage of the fictional Instagram account
of Jean‐Paul, an account having 1,3 million followers, is
an example of how the commodification of reputation
(Kurzman et al., 2007) is at the core of being an internet
celebrity. Jean‐Paul, as argued by the participants, made
a lucrative career from vlogging on YouTube, which he
shows off on Instagram:
We have a handsome guy, he has pictures of healthy
eating, from luxury clothes such as Balenciaga and
other expensive brands. You can see he has lots
of money, he shows his nice cars, shoes, and trav‐
els….He is a Dutch YouTuber, and he is also gay.
(Describing the collage of Jean Paul)
Yet, on the other hand, the unpretentious authenticity of
the fictional Instagram account of Sarah Snowwith 2,035
followers, shows that one’s reputational capital is not
related to being an internet celebrity per se. Presenting
as middle class, likeable, and a socially attractive person‐
ality is also an example of a “good” digital reputation:
We have a very normal girl. She has pictures from her
most beautiful moments. The pictures on her profile
show she has a new dog, bought a new outfit, that
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Figure 1. Fictional Instagram of Elijo symbolizing “good” reputation.
she went to a nice bar, and that she celebrates hav‐
ing been together with her boyfriend for over a year.
(Describing the collage of Sarah Snow)
Good reputations were symbolized in different ways,
ranging from being the handsome internet celebrity or
the “ordinary” Instagram girl next door. Yet both the col‐
lages of Jean Paul and Sarah Snow agree that one’s visual
identity should be well‐defined and personal, displayed
through a distinctive choice of commodities and clothes,
lifestyle, and image (Moran, 2014, p. 153).
Instagrammable reputation capital drives consumer
capitalism, and thus platform capitalism (Srnicek, 2016).
The focus on instagrammable reputation capital is yet
another way to extend capitalist production and the cre‐
ation of newmarkets (Moran, 2014). These newmarkets,
which produce new consumables that are used to sig‐
nify one’s reputation capital, are lucrative business for
social media platforms. They profit from time and traffic
spent on the platformwhen people do thework to shape
one’s “personal identity” and they profit again from tar‐
geted advertising, selling consumables that people need
to shape a well‐defined identity.
5.2. The Communication of Virtues as Reputation Capital
The fictional Instagram account Ilijo signifies good rep‐
utation by posting optimistic inspirational quotes such
as “smile at life and life will smile back at you,” the
account of Poyraz Aktas shows pictures symbolizing help‐
ing children in poverty, and finally the fictional Instagram
account Troye Sivan shows pictures symbolizing LGBT
activism and joining protest marches. The attention to
visualizing virtues such as optimism, fairness, inclusiv‐
ity, and diversity on social media was seen as crucial to
building reputation capital, but the participants recog‐
nized the irony of performing such a social conscience—
there is a performative aspect to signalling such virtues
on visual social media. For example, when describing
the fictional Instagram account of Sofie Demeers, virtues
such as “doing charity work” and “getting to know dif‐
ferent cultures” were recognized as clichés of visual
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self‐representation: “She has 1,099 followers. She has
pictures from doing charity work when she went on hol‐
iday to learn a new language, to get to know different
cultures, and all that ‘blablaba’” (describing the collage
of Sofie Demeers).
Rather pessimistically, Cremin (2012) refers to per‐
forming such a left‐liberal social conscience as “guilt
fetishism”; it shows compassion but ignores the struc‐
tural foundations of inequalities, often there is a resis‐
tance towards a more fundamental engagement with
inequalities. While this is a pessimistic take, there is
something to say about this in the context of digital rep‐
utation. As I have previously argued, the moral economy
of reputation is built around the expectations of eco‐
nomic return when maintaining a “good” digital reputa‐
tion; creating a self‐brand based on positivity and com‐
passion works well for influencers as it opposes shame
and scandal (Leaver et al., 2020, p. 220). Further, visualiz‐
ing virtues allows you to distinguish your personal iden‐
tity. This is something that participants recognized that
might help you to “find a job”:
Interviewer: Why does this profile focus on doing
charity work and being involved in activism?
Participants: It’s just….People like it. It’s good to vol‐
unteer! It makes it easy to find a job in the future.
(Describing the collage of Poyraz Aktas)
Identity management focuses on distinguishing your‐
self as respectable and likeable, for which the com‐
munication of positive virtues is a powerful strategy.
The hegemonic model of platform capitalism has helped
to introduce this “wish to do good.” Digital entrepreneurs
typically celebrate left‐liberal values and a “neo‐hippy
manner’’ way of doing business (McGuigan, 2014).
Building reputation capital means showing yourself as
being part of such a “wish to do good.” However, such
a moral economic principle deserves ethical criticism, as
it might also work against the “emancipatory, solidaris‐
tic potential of the social notion of identity” (Moran,
2014, p. 153).
6. Symbolizing “Bad” Digital Reputation
In total, four collages that signify “bad” digital reputation
were included in the analysis. Three of these accounts
were “anonymous,” signifying not identifying with your
real name as a marker of a bad reputation. There are
two ways in which “bad” digital reputations were sym‐
bolized. First, there was an agreement that sexual con‐
tent harms reputation capital. Second, it was seen as bad
to engage in online trolling and shaming. These are prac‐
tices to which I will refer to as “reputation warfare.”
6.1. Sexual Content Harms Reputation Capital
Figure 2 is the fictional Instagram account of Chanel,
showing a collage of female nudity that symbolizes
sexual content by showing practices such as sexting
(sharing [semi‐]nude pictures online), glorifying being a
“stripper,” teen pregnancy, having a sugar daddy, and
Figure 2. Fictional Instagram of Chanel symbolizing “bad” reputation.
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participating in reality‐TV shows such as Temptation
Island. The meanings assigned to those self‐repres‐
entations were paradoxical. On the one hand, partic‐
ipants described those visual self‐representations of
nude female bodies as “beautiful.” On the other hand,
they agreed that nudity can cause conflict and harm an
individual’s future reputation capital, certainly among
females and/or those who are “ordinary” as opposed
to (internet) celebrities. Digital reputation is gendered
(Salter, 2016) and reputation capital is lost, gained, or
maintained in different ways for different social groups:
“A guy is allowed to show more nudity than a woman.
When a guy poses in his swimsuit no one cares, but when
a woman is posing in a swimsuit, most people are imme‐
diately offended” (describing the collage of Chanel).
Maintaining a “good” reputation avoids not having
pictures circulating that can be weaponized against you
and thatmaydestroy your digital reputation. Notoriously,
sexual content has posed contentmoderation challenges
for popular social media platforms (Gillespie, 2018).
Inmanyways, digital reputation is a regulatory regime for
sexual self‐expression; high‐level stories of public humil‐
iation and revenge porn (Ronson, 2015) teach people
how posting sexual content is a bad idea. Platforms are
institutional agents that make choices of what nudity is
“acceptable” and they have an interest in pushing the
idea that online nudity is wrong. Popular platforms allow
users to share only limited experiences of bodily plea‐
sure in order to remain attractive to a mainstream pool
of users and advertisers (Gillespie, 2018).
6.2. Reputation Warfare and the Volatility of
Reputation Capital
The distinction between “good” and “bad” reputation
was not always clear. Accounts that symbolized “good”
reputation were also discussed as sometimes having
“bad” features. Particularly those accounts of internet
celebrities were found to be both “inspiring and depress‐
ing.” When influencers show off too much they eventu‐
ally risk losing their authenticity and “naturalness”:
I do not trust such types. From where do they have
the money to show off? Probably because they are
getting the money from posting that stuff I guess,
but I think it is misleading. Most of the time you
would think “oh so perfect,” but in the end… their life
is just as boring as yours. (Discussing the collage of
Jean Paul)
Discussions about “bad” reputation revealed the volatil‐
ity of digital reputation, or how popular social media are
a battleground for the making and unmaking of digital
reputation. Reputation warfare, what Rosamond (2019,
p. 14) defines as “capitalizing on reputation volatility,”
provides excitement and the pleasure of judging other’s
reputations and seeing them fall. An unidentified fic‐
tional Instagram account (its anonymity reveals its status
as not being “truthful”) engaged in posting “not pictures
of himself but pictures that shame others.” While this is,
as the participants stated “bad” it is nevertheless “fun
to follow.”
Finally, the fictional Facebook account of Gerard
Zuurpruim symbolizes a middle‐aged white man who
is an internet troll and “sees nothing positive in life
and who is friends with Donald Trump on Facebook.”
Moreover, “he ridicules everyone and everything.”
Gerard Zuurpruim symbolizes what Rosamond (2019)
sees as a “paradigmatic shift” in how reputation is made
sense of in culture and society since the 2016 Trump
presidential campaign, in which destroying reputation
became a “pleasurable spectacle” from which platform
capitalism has benefitted. The aim of Gerard Zuurpruim
is to strategically “[produce] reputational volatility”
(Rosamond, 2019, p. 3). It shows that, given the high
stakes of defending one’s reputation capital, the signifi‐
cation of digital reputation as “war” has become amean‐
ingful aspect of ordinary digital life, making digital repu‐
tation particularly vulnerable and exhausting, not only in
the arena of politics but also in digital youth culture.
7. Conclusions: The Banality of Reputation
So why then, despite the signification of digital reputa‐
tion, do I claim that digital reputation is “banal”?
I refer to digital reputation as “banal” (Shinkle,
2004) to argue there is a particular attitude towards
“reputation”—how people assign value and rank—that
is formed alongside values and beliefs that are in the
best interests of platform capitalism. I have observed
how the attitude towards digital reputation signifies the
use of a particular aesthetic that focuses on trivial plea‐
sures, commodities, marketable lifestyles, and perfor‐
mative left‐liberal virtues. Moreover, that “banal” atti‐
tude assesses information that distinguishes between
“good” and “bad” reputation not based on someone’s
qualities, but rather on their belonging to a social group;
reputational distinctions are driven by classificatory sys‐
tems based on essentialist, gendered, middle‐class val‐
ues, beliefs, and activities.
Such a moral economy of reputation based on the
suppression of difference and diversity deserves to be
fiercely criticized. “Good” reputations were primarily dis‐
cussed as gendered by participants,maintaining and rein‐
forcing gendered double standards. Moreover, class was
also discussed as a significant marker of reputation in
visual social media. Showing wealth combined with mes‐
sages of doing good and giving back are markers of rep‐
utation capital and distinction in the context of visual
social media. Finally, race was less explicitly visualized
and discussed as a marker of digital reputation but it
deserves further exploration, particularly given the signif‐
icance of reputation warfare for politics following Trump.
My point is that digital reputation is “banal” because
platform capitalismmade it meaningless. While a “good”
digital reputation has a clearly identifiable style and
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aesthetic in digital youth culture, it operates in a void
that is filled with commodities, opaque algorithms, and
reputational warfare. The banality of digital reputation
means that the assigning of value or rank is made with‐
out any agent taking epistemic responsibility for doing
so (Origgi, 2019, p. 160); no real or substantial informa‐
tion is made available to distinguish the “good” from the
“bad” reputations in popular social media, except for styl‐
ized banality, filled with materiality and commodities.
The point is that reputation should not be “banal”
and made meaningless. Many important political and
institutional decisions in a democracy rely on the evalu‐
ation of reputation and critical assessment of the infor‐
mation upon which such evaluations are made. Yet,
the assigning of value and rank should be carried out
responsibly, precisely to protect social groups from exclu‐
sion and democracy from manipulation. As Origgi (2019,
p. 162) states, the responsible assigning of reputation is
a significant socio‐cultural and technological challenge:
“We still lack appropriate and effective methods for navi‐
gating among epistemic hierarchies and guarding against
an obtuse and potentially authoritarian manipulation of
ranking methods that affect and can sometimes unfairly
solidify reputations.”
In digital societies, there is agreement that children
and young people should be taught the “digital skills”
to uphold a “good” digital reputation across platforms
to safeguard their future reputation capital. These dig‐
ital skills are aimed at making young people aware of
the searchability and durability of online content by, for
example, focusing on the importance of privacy settings
and the dangers of sharing (semi‐)nudes. While this is
done with the best intentions, focusing on techniques
for online reputation management is missing the point.
It maintains the banality of digital reputation and often
relies on social‐cultural dynamics of human classification
to distinguish between “good” and “bad” reputations.
Rather, focusing on contextualized, fair, ethical, critical,
and compassionate assessments of information for mak‐
ing decisions about reputations are skills that will be
muchmore beneficial to digital societies in the long term.
Finally, I would like to emphasize that my own assess‐
ment of the signification of reputation in digital youth
cultures as “banal” is no judgement of young people’s
socialmedia practices, but an ethical critique onplatform
capitalism. In digital life, there may be many reasons for
which banality may in fact not be meaningless. For one,
in a cultural climate where reputation volatility is capi‐
talized upon, banality works as a shield for reputational
warfare tactics such as shaming, bullying and humiliation.
Stylized banality—“smile at life and life will smile back at
you”—eases the affective burden that comes with main‐
taining one’s digital reputation.
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